Collide-a-scape

After Congress shelved the climate bill late last week, the conventional wisdom of green-minded opinionators was that future generations were doomed. A glum, dejected note sounded everywhere from Grist to the New York Times. This despairing attitude took on a ghoulish form when one environmentalist and prolific (but anonymous) blog commenter hoped in this thread that opponents of climate legislation had grandchildren, so these innocent progeny could suffer when “humanity rots.”

There is, however, an alternative perspective offered by one very prominent climate scientist who is a hero among climate activists. I had a feeling that James Hansen, author of Storms of my Grandchildren, might have a different take on the latest political development, so I emailed him last night. Here is his response:

The climate bill collapse is a great opportunity.  Environmentalists who thought they could somehow outmuscle the fossil fuel industry in backroom deals with politicians should reassess their position.  It is as sure as the law of gravity: as long as fossil fuels are the cheapest energy they will reign supreme.  The only solution is a rising price on carbon (a “cap” is not a price), collected from the fossil fuel companies, with the proceeds distributed to the public (not given by Congress to their favorite charity: fossil fuels, solar panels, etc.).  This is needed for stimulating the economy, reinvigorating American innovation, creating jobs, and solving our fossil fuel addiction.  It (fee-and-dividend or fee-and-green-check) is the only suggestion that solves the fossil fuel/climate problems.  Proposed legislation, including CLEAR, lock in fossil fuel dependence for as far as we can see into the future.

Hansen’s view that the climate bill was already fatally compromised is echoed by other environmental activists in this article in The Hill. True, Hansen is a vocal opponent of cap & trade, so perhaps it’s not much of a surprise that he sees a huge silver lining in the congressional “climate bill collapse.”And those voices quoted in The Hill article represent a minority within the climate activist community.

Still, it’ll be interesting to see if any mainstream advocates–many who seem to think that the U.S. Congress has now put the planet on an unalterable path to climate catastrophe– will chuck their defeatist mentality and embrace Hansen’s view.

The headline says it all:

Democrats Abandon Sweeping Energy Plan

Let the recriminations begin. Reports the NYT:

At a news conference, the [Senate] majority leader, Harry Reid of Nevada, blamed Republicans for refusing to cooperate. “We don’t have a single Republican to work with us,” Mr. Reid said.

Which is true, but not the whole truth:

While Mr. Reid criticized Republicans, it is clear he did not have sufficient support in his own party for a broad energy bill. A number of Democratic lawmakers from manufacturing and coal-producing states were expected to oppose such a bill.

Joe Romm seems conflicted on whose hide to rip. In this post, he pretty much blames President Obama’s top advisers, but in the comments he falls back on his favorite whipping boys:

I’ve repeatedly made clear that most of the blame lies with anti-science, pro-pollution conservatives and the media.

Yep. Sounds about right to me, if you’re looking for some convenient scapegoats.

More interesting to me: where do we go from here? What’s the new playbook?

As usual, Andy Revkin beats everyone to the punch with this provocative idea, which is bound to infuriate progressives:

Could it be that the White House has concluded what some political analysts have quietly told me — that only a Republican president could muster the Senate votes to pass a meaningful climate bill?

Hooo boy. That sounds like Nixon going to China. And pretty wishful thinking when one considers the conservative mold of the Republican party today.

Of course it’s too early to say, but I’m predicting some deep soul searching by climate advocates after the blame game runs its course. Then an all out power struggle over who gets to set the course correction. Anyone else care to make a prediction?

UPDATE: Roger Pielke Jr. on the Congressional climate bill collapse:

The bottom line is that the dominant approach to climate change promoted by those calling for action the loudest has failed — yet again. Really, how much more evidence is needed to convince those calling for action on climate change that a radically new approach is needed.

David Roberts at Grist might be ready to let his beard grow out and shuffle around with a sign that reads The End is Near:

It’s a sad, corrupt state of affairs this country finds itself in. I wish I had some hopeful words to offer. But at this point, American government appears to be broken. And our children and grandchildren will suffer for it.

Michael Levi, an energy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, says “the United States is in for a rocky time in international climate diplomacy.”

An extraordinary op-ed by four climate scientists, headlined “The Science Behind Climate Science,” asserts:

The urgent need to act cannot be overstated. Climate change caused by humans is already affecting our lives and livelihoods — with extreme storms, unusual floods and droughts, intense heat waves, rising seas and many changes in biological systems — as climate scientists have projected.

This is nectar to Joe Romm, “problematic” to Roger Pielke, Jr., who has written an email to one of the op-ed authors, asking:

I am unaware of research that shows either detection or attribution of human-caused changes in extreme storms or floods, much less detection or attribution of such changes “affecting lives and livelihoods”. Can you point me to the scientific basis for such claims?

This is really the nub of the big debate over climate change, not whether the science is established, but what are the detectable impacts. I think if it was incontestable that man-made climate change is causing the kind of extreme climatic changes and weather disasters that the op-ed asserts, we would have had a global treaty on carbon emissions by now. But the present-day impacts are not at all clear, though I’m open to persuasion–I really am. Which is why I’m anxious to see the reply that Roger gets.

No one should mistake my skepticism on this matter as an argument for inaction on climate change. As long-time readers of this blog know, I tend to favor decoupling climate change from the larger energy debate. I recognize that to some, this dilutes the “urgency” for action; I just happen to think you can get broader buy-in for decarbonisation with the approach laid out by the Hartwell group.

But it seems that the climate debate will continue to pivot on the contention that man-made climate catastrophe is not only inevitable–if no serious action is taken–but that, in fact, such catastrophe is already upon us. At least that’s how I interpret the Politico op-ed. [Update: A commenter says that I've mischaracterized the views of the op-ed authors with my "catastrophe" connotation, and I agree.]

If this is where the policy debate is destined to be decided, then we should vigorously engage it. To that end, I’d like to see Real Climate take up the science behind the assertions made in the Politico op-ed. RC is where controversial matters of climate science are most comprehensively aired out.

Let’s air this one out.

That was the story of oil’s birth, and it will be the story of its abrupt decline, predicts Stacy VanDeveer, a political scientist at the University of New Hampshire. In the interim, he offers some food for thought:

What are the implications for the existing petro states if we actually do bend the curve on carbon emissions?

The Economist, in a rather one-sided article, is dubious about the increasingly touted link between climate change and human conflict. It’s true that the “climate wars” narrative is starting to take on a life of its own. I’ve even used the term as a headline in a post. But it’s also obvious (from the comment thread in that post) that environmental security experts are careful not to make direct links between climate change and war. Rather, what they often say is that climate change represents a “threat multiplier” in geopolitical hot spots, where a marginal environment, resource conflict and chronic state instability are already the norm.

That said, there is this recent video montage of U.S. generals and admirals expressing their deep concerns about climate change. Additionally, there is a whole other set of geopolitical issues that are now being seen through the climate security lens.

The Economist article signals that the broader assertions of climate-triggered conflict are about to be scrutinized more closely. In that sense, environmental security experts and military brass who warn about global warming ought to be prepared for the kinds of tough questions that climate scientists are routinely asked about their projections.

That brings us back to the elephant in the room: Uncertainty. In a previous thread on this blog, one commenter who works in intelligence talked about how the issue of uncertainty figures into policy debates on various national security threats. He saw interesting parallels to the climate policy debate. In an email, I asked “Andy” to elaborate on these similarities and also to comment on the video of military professionals expressing their concerns about climate change. After providing some of his background, “Andy” offers a perspective that I hope triggers a productive discussion on the intersection between risk, policy, and cost/benefit considerations.

*****

My experience is military intelligence – I’ve never worked for a civilian agency, though I’ve spent time working with people that do, obviously.  My current job involves unmanned aerial vehicles (predator and reaper mainly) in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I’ve been in the intelligence business for almost 20 years and my expertise is intelligence support to military forces, contingency planning and strategic warning.

The video montage is interesting. They are doing what military and intelligence people do – they see a potential threat which stimulates their institutional desire to contingency plan for that threat.  They see the scope of the threat and potential impacts are still uncertain but real enough to cause genuine concern.  One shouldn’t interpret this as a call-to-action for one’s preferred ideological solution. It’s actually a call for more analysis – not analysis of the science (which is outside their expertise) – but analysis of what can and should be done to address the problem.  The process for this in national security is contingency planning and to me, that is the key concept that I take away from the video, even though it’s not explicitly stated.

Good contingency planning doesn’t rely on fixed assumptions because plans made under today’s assumptions are likely to fail when they meet tomorrow’s reality. Rarely do our assumptions hold true over time.   Therefore we need a holistic and flexible approach which considers a variety of assumptions.  We need to consider resource allocation on a continuum and prioritize the potential threat of climate change under a variety of assumptions vs other potential and not-so-potential threats, interests and values.  We can’t afford to put all our eggs in one basket.

The military, for example, aspires to have a “full spectrum” force that can deal with humanitarian crises, high-intensity conventional warfare and everything in between.  Part of that includes planning for both likely and unlikely scenarios.  As a result the military is rarely fully-prepared for any one contingency, but is usually “prepared enough” for a wide range of contingencies.  That method of dealing with uncertainty has proven itself over time.  I personally believe (and this is probably the result of my own professional bias) that we need to prepare for climate change in a similar “full spectrum” manner, at least until there is sufficient political consensus to focus efforts in one area.

What is politically possible also needs to be considered simply because political structures (governments in this case) usually aren’t willing to suffer high opportunity costs unless the solution is a sure thing.  I think those who are predisposed to certain policy solutions need to keep that in mind – particularly those at the CAGW end of the spectrum.  From my armchair I think a lot of those advocates are shooting themselves in the foot.  Litmus tests regarding what is appropriate skepticism, for example, are not likely to generate the political support necessary to enable the policy you want – quite the opposite actually.  You’ll get high-fives from supporters and alienation from everyone else.  In order to achieve policy action on the scale you believe is required, you need to make the tent bigger, not smaller.  So it seems to me you are thinking tactically and not strategically – maybe you win some battles, but you risk losing the war.  Just something to think about.

One thing to keep in mind about senior military officers and national security people is that they are a parochial bunch who usually have bureaucratic interest in mind.  Despite all the intelligence reforms after 9/11, parochial interest still reigns and all the various agencies both cooperate and compete.  As our federal budget increasingly comes under intense pressure, you’re going to see a lot of people try to keep their organizations away from the budget ax by taking on new “threats.”  Climate change therefore represents an opportunity for parochialism that can’t be completely ignored when assessing the views of senior officials with budgetary skin in the game.  That’s a sad indictment of my own organization and profession, but I’ve seen it all too often to believe it will be any different regarding climate change.

Returning to the national security aspect of climate change for a minute, I think the focus will primarily be on consequence management because of the policy tools we have in the greater policy toolbox.  We are not equipped to deal with, for example, a carbon-reduction strategy.  The US military, in particular, has unique capabilities to quickly react to problems overseas – see the recent disaster in Haiti, for example.  Since our toolbox is limited and since we inevitably have our institutional parochialism, I doubt you will see many national security folks argue for a carbon reduction strategy if that will negatively impact their parochial interests (ie. budgets) – in other words, the military and national security bureaucracy will, in my judgment, tend to favor consequence management policies over carbon reduction.

Finally, one reason that I’ve become so interested in climate change is because it is very similar in character (but not content) to traditional national security problems.  I mentioned a few such problems in my earlier comment and I’ll focus on one here – nuclear terrorism.  Currently, this is deemed the preeminent threat to US national security (see here for a summary). This is a threat that’s difficult to quantify in terms of probabilities and there is a wide range of opinion on how to deal with it.  There are “denialists” who think it’s not much of a problem at all –so unlikely as to be irrelevant and thus requiring no policy change.  At the other end of the spectrum are those who think it’s only a matter of time before a US city gets nuked unless we take bold and decisive action now.  Does that dichotomy sound familiar?  Of course there is a middle-ground where we take reasonable, cost-effective measures to reduce the threat (increased security, better controls of nuclear material, better intelligence and detection), create and maintain capabilities to deal with the consequences should the threat materialize (response teams, medical and decontamination capabilities, etc.)  and work on a long-term solution to the problem (reduction/elimination of nuclear weapons, more limits and oversight of nuclear activities internationally, etc.).  Not coincidentally, those cost-effective measures have positive secondary effects in other areas.

Iran’s nuclear program is another example.  There are many uncertainties regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.  Even if we assume the worst, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the sure-fire remedy – toppling the government through military force – would be the wisest option.  Actions have consequences and before formulating policy we need to be reasonably sure the cure won’t be worse than the disease.

In short, I see a lot of wishful thinking on both sides of the climate change debate rooted in unrealistic and unachievable policy preferences.  I can’t definitively speak to intentions, but my sense is that many people begin with a policy preference borne out of tribal ideology instead of thoroughly examining the problem in all its complexity. In my opinion, what we need is serious policy analysis that examine costs, benefits and risks and we need to create plans that include a variety of actions flowing from a variety of assumptions instead of considering only the policy we are predisposed to.

*****

What do you think of the framework Andy proposes for addressing the vexing issues of uncertainty, security threats and cost-benefit considerations?

The previous thread on climate skeptics is a marvel in many ways, but I find myself looking for a segue into more productive territory. Fortunately, one commenter has laid out a path:

It would be nice if all sides of this discussion would recognize that there are rational reasons for skepticism as well as for the consensus view. Similarly, it is quite possible to agree with the mainstream science while rejecting any or all of the current basket of policy proposals. Or to support those proposals regardless of the science.

Could this be a framework for common ground between all the sides?

In the public sphere, where the various running debates on climate science and climate policy are most fiercely fought, the uncertainty factor is often downplayed or glossed over. Subsequently, it gets little attention in the media.

And that’s a shame, because in the decision-making sphere, the uncertainty factor is very much on the minds of everyone from water managers in Denver to national security planners in the Pentagon. And they have to make some hard decisions, regardless of what happens with the energy/climate bill in Congress or treaty negotiations on the international stage. That’s because for both water managers and security planners (even though they work in very different arenas), there are huge unknowns with respect to the projected localized impacts of global warming.

So I think it’s notable that Gavin Schmidt highlights this issue over at Real Climate, with a new post that draws attention to this paper, called, “Options for Improving Climate Modeling to Assist Water Utility Planning for Climate Change.” Despite the wonky title, the paper is well worth reading for anyone interested in how the uncertainty factor is being grappled with at the ground level in water management circles. It’s also notable that Gavin chose to spotlight this clever play on a famous phrase, which is taken from that paper:

Grant us…
The ability to reduce the uncertainties we can;
The willingness to work with the uncertainties we cannot;
And the scientific knowledge to know the difference.

As I pointed out last week, it seems that national security experts are mouthing that same prayer. This is a good place for me to mention a recent paper that I’ve been meaning to discuss. It’s called, “Lost in Translation: Closing the Gap Between National Security Policy and Climate Science.” Here’s one passage that jumped out at me:

For the past 20 years, scientists have been content to ask simply whether most of the observed warming was caused by human activities. But is the percentage closer to 51 percent or to 99 percent? This question has not generated a great deal of discussion within the scientific community, perhaps because it is not critical to further progress in understanding the climate system. In the policy arena, however, this question is asked often and largely goes unanswered.

That brings me to one of the arguments that climate researcher Judith Curry has been making of late on this blog, which might best be summarized here:

we need to do a much better job of characterizing, assessing, and reasoning about uncertainty regarding this extremely complex system of climate science and the climate-science policy interface.

In other recent threads at this site, Judith has elaborated on where some of the key uncertainty lies and why it is necessary to engage forthrightly about it.

During some of this discussion, Judith laid out where she thinks people engaged in the climate debate line up on the uncertainty spectrum. Below is a slight modification of the categories she first mentioned here.

*****

Regarding uncertainty, my take is that there are 5 different ways of dealing with it (an adaptation of Van der Sluijs):

1. Uncertainty denier – pretend it doesn’t exist, or underestimate it or try to keep the discussion away from the topic. Uncertainty denying or the “never admit error” strategy can be motivated by a political agenda or because of fear that uncertain science will be judged as poor science by the outside world.

2. Uncertainty reducer –  ”reduce the uncertainty” mantra, of the early IPCC reports and also the US CCSP Strategic Plan. A laudable goal, but reducing uncertainty will prove to be vain in the long run: for each uncertainty that science reduces, several new ones will pop up due to unforeseen complexities. Further there is a class of uncertainties (ontic or aleatory uncertainties) that are fundamentally not reducible.

3. Uncertainty simplifier – fit complex uncertainties into nice categories.  The subjective Bayesian approach of Moss and Schneider (expert judgment) fits here, this has been the uncertainty recipe for the IPCC 3rd and 4th assessment reports, e.g. the likely, very likely stuff. Uncertainty simplifiers, while they definitely pay attention to uncertainty, they tend to be inadvertent uncertainty minimizers.

4. Uncertainty detectives –  well, all scientists should work hard to understand, represent, and reason about uncertainty (climate scientists generally don’t do a great job at this). The conflict is when political opponents seize on this uncertainty as an excuse for inaction.

5. Uncertainty assimilator – include uncertainty information in rational decision support systems and policies.

We need to get to #5.  This is not simple, since climate assessment (e.g. IPCC) is stuck in #3 right now.  My efforts to move it to #4 are being met with apparent calls to go back to #1.  We have to work our way through #4 before we get to #5.  Will #4 result in blood on the floor and more polarization?  On the contrary, it may actually enable the two sides of scientists to become less polarized, which will take some of the steam out of the political uncertainty embracers. Moving forward in the science requires #4.  #4 will also improve the policy and decision making process.

*****

If various decision-makers (such as those water managers and security experts) are grasping for a handle on the uncertainties associated with climate change, then maybe it’s only a matter of time before our fractious public debates pivot on the collaboration between (#4) uncertainty detectives and (#5) uncertainty assimilators.

But to even get to that point might require a constant invocation of that Uncertainty Prayer spotlighted at Real Climate.

Guess who’s asking the hard questions on climate science and policy. The U.S. military and geopolitical/security specialists.

Earlier this week, an array of of defense, national security and climate experts took part in a conference hosted by the Scripps Oceanography Center for Environment and National Security. This was the symposium agenda and here’s the opener from a story by Lauren Morello:

Tell us what you don’t know.

That’s the message military and national security experts gathered here want to send to climate scientists.

This follows on the heels of a panel event held earlier this month by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change Security program. That discussion, between environmental security scholars and policy experts, explored

the unintended security consequences of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.

The conversation there appears to have centered on the complicated interplay between energy policy, food security, environmental conservation and geopolitical concerns, among other things. Here’s a nice overview of the specific issues covered, and this summation:

The panelists stressed that taking actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change is necessary, but that we must evaluate the full range of potential effects of these strategies. “We need to blow open the box on how complicated these problems are,” [Cleo] Paskal said. “We need as many different people involved and as many different sorts of solutions as possible.”

Paskal is a climate security scholar, whose recent book Global Warring: How Environmental, Economic and Political Crises will Redraw the World Map, I reviewed several months ago for Nature.  (I have a longstanding interest in the environment/security nexus; here’s an exchange with experts and a related interview I conducted recently on this blog.)

To me, the calls for better forecasting and additional voices and options at the climate policy table is a good thing. In some popular quarters of the blogosphere, though, where climate change is of paramount concern (and political calculations are always present), this plea for more information by military and security experts is likely to be considered “unhelpful.” Heck, on one influential blog, raising such nettlesome issues that draws undue attention to any limitations of climate science and a preferred policy prescription, is liable to get you pegged as an “anti-science, climate disinformer/delayer.”

Climate bloggers belong to one of the more politically relevant subcultures in the blogosphere. It’s hard to quantify to what degree they influence the public discourse on climate science and policy. Suffice to say: they matter.

But I would argue that only the two opposite ends of the climate spectrum in the blogosphere are represented in the media and the public debate. That, in my view, has contributed to an oversimplification of climate issues and helped exacerbate polarization of the public dialogue. As a journalist who sometimes reports on climate change, I bear my share of responsibility.

But one of the benefits of having my own blog is that I can do my (small) part to rectify this blind spot. So in the last year, as I’ve dived deeper into the climate blogosphere, I have discovered a rich array of thoughtful voices and perspectives that are located across the climate spectrum. They deserve greater appreciation and exposure.

So last week, I reached out to two climate bloggers I have come to admire for their nuanced views and the way they conduct themselves. They occupy a nebulous middle ground in the spectrum, and while their blogs defy simple labels, I would have to say that their peers in the climate blogosphere probably place them on opposite sides of the climate debate, based on where they think their sympathies lie.

My objective here was to push back against such one-dimensional categorization (including my own), which is often reflected in the impolite comment threads of any blogs that delve into climate science or climate policy. I figure that if there is common ground to be established in the climate debate, perhaps two climate bloggers who are known for their civility and who, perception-wise, are considered to be on opposite sides, can help pave the way.

Bart Verheggen is a Holland-based atmospheric scientist, who is unfailingly polite and often quite insightful. In addition to his own blog, Bart is a frequent commenter at many climate blogs, where he often raises the level of debate.

Chicago-based Lucia Liljegren is a mechanical engineer who has worked at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (on projects related to remediation and storage of radioactive nuclear waste) and as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics at Iowa State University. Judith Curry, a climate researcher at Georgia Tech, calls Lucia “probably the least controversial person in the climate blogosphere, because of her cheerfulness and sense of humor, honesty, and open mindedness.”

Several days ago, I chatted with both Lucia and Bart via Skype. After editing the transcribed hour long conversation, I asked both of them to look over my edit of the transcript and make any necessary clarifications. They made minimal changes. Below is part one of the exchange.

Keith: Stanford University’s Jon Krosnick has a new poll out this week, which he says reaffirms that a “large majority of Americans” believe that man-made global warming is happening, and that something should be done about it. Taking note, Roger Pielke Jr. wrote:

As I have said for many years…the battle for public opinion on climate change has been won by those who argue that there is a profound human influence on climate and action is warranted. This has been the message of opinion polls for as long as 20 years.

Yet in the climate blogosphere, there continues to be this highly charged battle between two sides, the skeptics of anthropogenic global warming (AGW) and those who belong to that “large majority.” So why is there this endless warring if the battle for public opinion has been won?

Bart: I think the [climate] blogosphere is dominated by the extremes of either side, of those who very much downplay the [climate change] problem and those who are very much convinced of the problem and indeed in some circumstances overplay the problem.

Lucia: Definitely in terms of composition, you get both of those groups.  My blog gets people who do think that there is either so little warming as to not matter at all, or that the warming we have is all natural. I don’t think they’re a majority on my blog, but there are some. And I know there are other blogs (such as wattsupwiththat) where there’s a lot of people who either think there is no warming or admit that there’s warming in the record but don’t believe it’s caused by people.

I think people on both ends just want to talk more.

Bart: Do you think so? I have the feeling that a lot of people on both ends are actually quite content talking to their own, because they each consider the other side—or at least the more extreme ones on either side—they feel that the more extreme ones on the other side are lunatics.

Keith: In a recent post, Andrew Freedman wrote that, “climategate”

helped foster the notion that climate science is controlled by a tight-knit cabal of experts determined to rig the science to suit their best interests.

Lucia, do you believe that?

Lucia: All of climate science, certainly not. The emails do show some people trying to control certain publications, and exerting a lot of influence in some of those discussions back and forth. There are many, many climate scientists doing research without regard to any sort of notion of what the right answer is. But I think there is some tendency for what Judy Curry called tribalism, and attempts to block certain types of information…maybe not block it, but at least make it very low visibility. So it can never be all of climate science, it just wouldn’t even happen. But things can happen that sort of make things lean in one way or the other and that’s kind of the way I see things. What do you think Bart?

Bart: I would express myself maybe slightly differently, but I don’t have a big issue with what you’re saying. I do think, indeed that climategate spread “the notion that climate science is controlled by a tight-knit cabal” who rig the science in a preconceived direction far and wide. And I do think that that notion is a very implausible conspiracy theory, which Lucia alluded to, and for which there is no evidence at all, neither in the emails or anywhere else.

That said, I do know there is a certain degree of defensiveness from the part of climate scientists and their supporters toward people who have criticism. (Just to also note: I have never been in any high profile climate research, and I have not been involved with the IPCC; I’m just on the sidelines here.) And that degree of defensiveness, that is what I agree with in Judith Curry’s analysis and I also feel kind of the same with what Lucia is saying here. To what extent that goes further into blocking other views, or diminishing their visibility on purpose, that’s something that I’m not so sure of and I would actually tend to think not. But to be honest, I don’t really know.

I do think that the defensive attitudes are basically the response of scientists being attacked by so many people. And a big portion of those people who have criticism—not everyone, I’d like to add—but a big portion of them do so with a totally incoherent set of arguments, like “oh, there’s no warming,” or “there’s a little warming and it’s good, and by the way, it’s due to the sun…”

Lucia: Well, you have to be a little bit careful when you put those all together, because there’s many different people.

Bart: Yes, true.

Lucia: Bart’s accusation is that one person individually holds many incoherent views all at the same time, and while there may be a few people out there like that, more often its one person has theory A, one person has theory B, one has theory C.

Bart: You are very right, and the criticism comes in many shades of gray. That’s absolutely correct. And I think that the climate scientific establishment and their supporters should indeed examine their sometimes overly defensive attitudes. To immediately ascribe any criticism to like, “oh, you’re a stupid skeptic or a denier,” or whatnot, well some of the criticism might actually have merit. (Even though on the internet, I think it’s a minority.)

Keith: Lucia, I know you see yourself in the middle of the climate spectrum. What blogs are closer to the far end of the skeptic spectrum?

Lucia: Obviously Anthony Watts runs posts that highlight the notion there are big gaps in the case for Anthropogenic global warming. And they’ll mostly be against the idea it’s anthropogenic. So that one is definitely more skeptical of warming than mine would be.

Keith: What blogger is on the far end of the AGW spectrum.

Lucia: I’d say Joe Romm. I would put him on the strongest AGW, advocacy/activist end of the spectrum. I do find his long, stream of consciousness screeds difficult to read.

Keith: Bart, how would you define the spectrum?

Bart: I have a different view of the spectrum than Lucia has. I remember Michal Tobis on his blog had a good characterization of the spectrum. I would say that mainstream science is in the ‘middle’, which in the blogosphere is represented by sites like Real Climate, and other scientists like James Annan, William Connolley, Michael Tobis, Robert Grumbine, SkepticalScience and others.  That’s what I would characterize as the middle ground. Because it’s really a fairly good representation of what you also read in the literature.

The IPCC position is kind of the middle ground there. And then you have people who critique it with varying levels of intensity and with varying levels of evidence based, as Lucia is doing. And you have more paranoia-based ones, such as Marc Morano. That’s someone who I would put on the lunatic fringe on the skeptic side. And there’s definitely a broad range in between—including both paranoid and (more or less) valid criticisms. Of course, there is also a critique that the IPCC position is too conservative, which I discussed on my blog.

Then you have someone like Steve McIntyre, who sometimes has valid criticisms, but he packages it in such a way, that it goes against all my… [searching for the right words]

Keith: Is it his tone?

Bart: It’s the hidden insinuations and accusations that he’s always putting down there. And the way he slams the climate scientists and put motives there…I don’t like it at all. It takes away from some things he might have a valid point in. Now I’m not actually interested at all in the hockey stick debate. So I’m not following things [at Climate Audit] in detail, but he might actually have some points there. I’m not saying he doesn’t.

And then you have on the other side [of the spectrum], you have…yeah Joe Romm, goes sometimes…he’s a tricky case to characterize. I don’t like his style of communication. I think he’s a little bit too strong with language. By and large, though, he doesn’t stray far away from the science. He doesn’t often say things that are wrong. He does, however, put out a one-sided view. If you say, he emphasizes worst cases and de-emphasizes others, yes, that is something he does sometimes.

On the lunatic fringe of the alarmist side—and I don’t like that word, alarmist, at all—there are people who claim that the world is going to end in 20 years and humanity will go extinct if we don’t put down 100,000 windmills tomorrow. For me, they would be the equivalent of Marc Morano. Joe Romm doesn’t come even close to being such an equivalent.

Keith: Lucia, what about Bart’s contention that Steve McIntyre undermines his legitimate criticism with his insinuations or the way he goes about communicating them?

Lucia: Well, I’m not sure Steve does that. I can understand why Bart thinks it’s that way. It’s difficult to judge it without looking at some of the history. It’s not at all clear to me what the cause and effect of that is. It’s not clear to me because I didn’t start reading Climate Audit when the first hockey stick wars all started. But there’s a point of view out there that when Steve was presenting these things in the tone that Bart would think is the more appropriate one, he was still getting shot down and treated badly and was on the receiving end of the snide remarks and a lot of other things. So I don’t know which is the chicken and which is the egg.

Bart: I don’t know either. I haven’t followed that from the start either. I have my suspicions, but I don’t really know, I haven’t checked it out.

Keith: Bart, on your blog you once wrote:

The more relevant discussion for society is about how to deal with climate change (rather than about Siberian tree rings or other scientific details). How do we act in the face of uncertainty, but with real risks of problematic consequences?

What do you make of that Lucia?

Lucia: Actually, Bart and I interact most often at Roger Pielke Jr.’s blog. That’s the kind of topic that Roger often brings up.  I don’t even bring them up, because I don’t have as many ideas as to what we can actually get through in the political process.

But it’s absolutely true that the real questions are, what sorts of actions are we going to take? I tend to take the view that, people need to talk about actions we can take that would be beneficial whether or not someone believes climate change is happening and whether or not it was caused by humans. Because sometimes the whole debate about that discussion gets in the way of some issues that have to do with energy sources we need to access that we can resolve without learning whether or not climate change is true. Or at least you can get some line of agreement. You’ll never get 100 percent.

Keith: Along those lines, there’s a new paper out from Roger and other scholars–known as the the Hartwell Paper–that argues we should decouple climate change from energy policy. And then we can move on from this war over climate science, which I’m sure both of you would agree is, to a large degree, a proxy war over policy. Should we do that, should we just get past the climate science war and stop pretending what the real fight is about?

Bart: Not entirely. First of all,  I don’t think we should decouple the climate change issue from energy policy, but I do agree that we should stop pretending what the real fight is about, which is: How to respond to climate change?

Secondly, If we leave the question totally aside of whether there is climate change and whether it was caused by humans, and only do what we would otherwise also do because of declining fossil fuel reserves and other concerns (geopolitical, environmental, health), I think in a way, then, we would be giving in to the people that don’t believe there is such a thing as anthropogenic global warming.

I think on the other hand, the more rational approach—how I see it—would be to take the broad scientific view of the [climate change] problem, with associated uncertainties and risks, and out of that view, then say, well, given what we know of the uncertainties and risks, what is the prudent action to do. I sometimes characterize this situation at my blog, as if it’s bad, it’s really bad, and if it’s good, it’s still pretty bad. In other words, our current actions are actually still too little in a way, even if climate change is less of a problem than we think it is, even if climate sensitivity is 1.5 or 2 degrees rather than 3 degrees per doubling of CO2, which is deemed the most likely value. Of course, things could also turn out worse than expected.

Lucia: But the question is, what if there is a way to make decisions where we reduce the amount of reliance on carbon types of fuel without necessarily resolving the issue of climate change. The issue of climate change can still continue to be discussed. But if we’re trying to decide whether we’re gonna encourage nuclear power, whether we’re going to encourage alternate energy methods, there are other good reasons that have to do that, which have to do with energy security, peak oil and other types of reasons. Is it necessary that we must have everybody on board, agreeing with the IPCC’s view of climate change?

Bart: I’m not saying that we shouldn’t discuss climate science anymore. If people who are so inclined, like you and I, who want to discuss those kinds of details, then sure, go ahead.

But the thing is, right now, a lot of the discussion that is purportedly about climate science, is actually much more about the different ideas people have on how to respond to an issue like this: those who want to do something about the problem, and those who don’t want to do something. That’s what the disagreement is really about, I think. In a way, the debate about climate proxies is just a proxy for the debate on how to respond to the [climate change] issue.

But I think you’re right. There’s a lot of other reasons to reduce our reliance on carbon-based fuels. But a lot of those reasons don’t have the same urgency, because fossil fuel reserves are declining slowly…and if it’s just about fossil fuels, then people will say, “we can do a bit more innovation of new technology, and that’s really it, there’s no reason to put solar panels anywhere.” I think climate change is still an important factor besides the other factors that make decarbonization a very important issue.

Keith: Well, we should talk about this, because that sense of urgency is something that is hotly debated across the climate spectrum. Here’s the thing: there seems to be wide agreement by scientists that the worst of potential consequences won’t be felt until later in this century, decades down the road. So if the average person looks out his window and doesn’t see any urgency, and he doesn’t feel personally affected by climate change, it seems a little problematic to have a policy debate on climate change hinge on the urgency argument.

Lucia: As a practical matter, if you’re going to persuade people about the urgency of climate change, that is problematic. When you have a democracy and you have to get people to make collective decisions, the fact that on a day to day basis, especially when you live in, say, Illinois or Minnesota, it’s hard to look out there and say, gosh, this looks urgent. Without doing extensive reading, it makes that a very hard sell.

So some of the other things would be easier sells to get things changed. People don’t like to see their energy prices going up. The notion that you could have more sustained progress and keep your energy bills down by trying to invest in alternative energy might be more attractive to some people. Of course, you’re still going to have arguments about whether or not it’s true. But urgency is a hard sell.

Keith: Leaving aside the practical hurdles that makes climate change a hard sell, what about the case for scientific urgency, which Bart was alluding to? I think what he was saying is that all these other reasons for decarbonization are important but they don’t come with that same sense of urgency as anthropogenic global warming. Do you agree with that Lucia?

Lucia: [A long pause] You see, on a blog I can just like, not answer that. I’m finding myself…I mean, I know the urgency argument is a very hard sell. There’s certainly the case, that if there is uncertainty, and the reality of AGW falls on the high side, combined with an uncertainty on the high side is correct, and heat capacity– the planet is big and responds slowly – then, if things are worse than we think, then there’s definitely a huge urgency and we would need to be doing stuff.

But the problem is that you have the urgency argument coupled with the uncertainty argument. [Note: In a follow-up email exchange, Lucia wrote: "I was thinking about the counter argument of what if the truth is on the low side of the uncertainty spread-- well, what then?"]  I think we need to do something now, and I would really like to see us going towards more nuclear options and I like alternative energy, if we can get people to put them in [KK: Lucia is referring to NIMBYISM.]  As I said, I usually avoid blogging about this, because there’s a lot of hard questions that I just don’t have very good answers for.

Bart: I don’t have real answers to that either. But I think it’s true what you say, that the urgency is a very hard sell, because it’s kind of counterintuitive to the nature of the problem. [Global warming] is pretty much a problem in slow motion. In that sense, the word urgency is very counterintitutive. And I don’t actually know if those other reasons for decarbonization, like energy independence, declining fossil fuel reserves, safety, health… I say they’re not very urgent but I don’t claim to know very much about any of those other aspects. So I’m not actually so sure about that part of my statement.

But the reason why I think climate science tells us climate change is more urgent than it seems at first sight is exactly those time scales you allude to. In order to change the energy system, that takes a tremendous amount of time. David Keith made an argument along these lines in some presentations.

There’s a big inertia in the energy system, there’s also a big inertia in the carbon cycle. If you reduce your emissions, it takes a long time for the concentration to actually go down, because it’s a long lifetime for Co2. The climate system has a lot of inertia as well: It takes time for the temperature to respond to a change in concentration.

So you have a large amount of inertia in the energy system, in the carbon cycle and in the climate system, which means if you start taking actions, it’s decades into the future until they start taking effect.

If you combine that inertia in those different systems, with uncertainty of the precise effect, and with some knowledge that it could go pretty wrong with a business as usual scenario, then you have to take proactive steps, and that’s where the urgency comes from.

In my view, it’s similar to a chainsmoker who gets told by a physician, “hey, you should really be careful, you should stop smoking if you care about your heath.” And the person says, “hey I can still bike to the town and I feel fine and my grandmother lived until she was 96 and died in a car accident.”

You can postpone dealing with smoking until you’re in the intensive care unit. But that’s a little late. That’s the line of argument in which I see the urgency of climate global warming.

Lucia: But whenever you have uncertainties in that chain of ifs, that’s where it’s extremely difficult to assess how urgent is it. It’s certainly urgent enough that we should be doing something. What exactly we should be doing, I’m not sure. I’m puzzled to figure out what would actually work.

**Postscript**

On Monday, I’ll post the second and final part of our conversation, which features an exchange on why the blogosphere is not conducive to nuanced debate on climate change.

UPDATE: Be sure to check out Lucia’s comment thread. Lots of good comments there, plus a visit from Steve McIntyre (Comment#45729), who slyly moves the pea under the thimble:

I’m puzzled as to Bart’s apparent antipathy for Climate Audit. I try to write accurately and to correct errors if they are brought to my attention. If I’ve made errors in any posts, I’d appreciate it if Bart would identify them for me so that I can make an appropriate correction.

In response, Bart lifted the pea (Comment#45749):

My issues with your writing is not in alleged errors you do or don’t make, but rather in how you package your message. It often reads as the noble detective trying to unravel some massive fraud, insinuating all kinds of things, mostly subtle (but apparently very clear to your followers nevertheless), sometimes less subtle (“try not to puke”).

To understand why the new global warming survey by Stanford’s Jon Krosnick is such a mixed bag for climate advocates, just read Kevin Drum’s despairing reaction to it.

But I’m getting ahead of myself. As Krosnick lays out convincingly in this meaty NYT op-ed:

huge majorities of Americans still believe the earth has been gradually warming as the result of human activity and want the government to institute regulations to stop it.

So far, so good, right? Read on (emphasis added):

Fully 86 percent of our respondents said they wanted the federal government to limit the amount of air pollution that businesses emit, and 76 percent favored government limiting business’s emissions of greenhouse gases in particular. Not a majority of 55 or 60 percent — but 76 percent.

Large majorities opposed taxes on electricity (78 percent) and gasoline (72 percent) to reduce consumption. But 84 percent favored the federal government offering tax breaks to encourage utilities to make more electricity from water, wind and solar power.

And huge majorities favored government requiring, or offering tax breaks to encourage, each of the following: manufacturing cars that use less gasoline (81 percent); manufacturing appliances that use less electricity (80 percent); and building homes and office buildings that require less energy to heat and cool (80 percent).

Now do you see why Drum is pounding his head against the wall? If not, let him explain (emphasis added):

So there you have it: the American public believes in global warming and wants the government to do something about it. However, the American public doesn’t want to do anything — carbon taxes or cap-and-trade — that might actually work. But they do want to open the federal goody bag and dole out subsidies and tax breaks to everyone under the sun, presumably because these all sound like pleasant things to do and they’re under the impression that they’re all “free.” Whether they work or not isn’t really on their radar.

Whether they work or not. I submit that this crucial question (which should include carbon tax and cap & trade) hasn’t been much on the radar of bloggers like Drum or Matthew Yglesias, who takes issue with Drum’s dire assessment. The problem with Yeglesias’s analysis of the Krosnick poll is that he’s blaming conservatives for making the American public dumb and resistant on the issue of taxes. Whether that’s true or not isn’t important right now. What’s important is that Americans have no interest whatsoever in cutting back their consumption or taking money out of their wallets to help arrest climate change. That should be the takeaway message from Krosnick’s survey.

So these latest polling results, combined with Senator Lindsey Graham’s latest pirouette, should serve as a loud wake-up call to climate advocates. But the early indications are that denial has set in. For example, on the import of Graham’s turnabout, David Roberts at Grist seems willfully oblivious:

So the climate bill’s already slim chances are now considerably slimmer. But the basic calculus hasn’t changed: If Obama goes all-out after a bill, it could happen. If he doesn’t, it can’t.

Really? I bet Obama thinks the calculus has changed considerably.

So are we ready to move on yet and take up Drum’s fundamental question (which has to include all policy levers): whether what’s being proposed will work or not? Are we ready to listen to outside-the-beltway perspectives, some of which favor decoupling climate change from energy policy?