Collide-a-scape

The Economist, in a rather one-sided article, is dubious about the increasingly touted link between climate change and human conflict. It’s true that the “climate wars” narrative is starting to take on a life of its own. I’ve even used the term as a headline in a post. But it’s also obvious (from the comment thread in that post) that environmental security experts are careful not to make direct links between climate change and war. Rather, what they often say is that climate change represents a “threat multiplier” in geopolitical hot spots, where a marginal environment, resource conflict and chronic state instability are already the norm.

That said, there is this recent video montage of U.S. generals and admirals expressing their deep concerns about climate change. Additionally, there is a whole other set of geopolitical issues that are now being seen through the climate security lens.

The Economist article signals that the broader assertions of climate-triggered conflict are about to be scrutinized more closely. In that sense, environmental security experts and military brass who warn about global warming ought to be prepared for the kinds of tough questions that climate scientists are routinely asked about their projections.

That brings us back to the elephant in the room: Uncertainty. In a previous thread on this blog, one commenter who works in intelligence talked about how the issue of uncertainty figures into policy debates on various national security threats. He saw interesting parallels to the climate policy debate. In an email, I asked “Andy” to elaborate on these similarities and also to comment on the video of military professionals expressing their concerns about climate change. After providing some of his background, “Andy” offers a perspective that I hope triggers a productive discussion on the intersection between risk, policy, and cost/benefit considerations.

*****

My experience is military intelligence – I’ve never worked for a civilian agency, though I’ve spent time working with people that do, obviously.  My current job involves unmanned aerial vehicles (predator and reaper mainly) in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I’ve been in the intelligence business for almost 20 years and my expertise is intelligence support to military forces, contingency planning and strategic warning.

The video montage is interesting. They are doing what military and intelligence people do – they see a potential threat which stimulates their institutional desire to contingency plan for that threat.  They see the scope of the threat and potential impacts are still uncertain but real enough to cause genuine concern.  One shouldn’t interpret this as a call-to-action for one’s preferred ideological solution. It’s actually a call for more analysis – not analysis of the science (which is outside their expertise) – but analysis of what can and should be done to address the problem.  The process for this in national security is contingency planning and to me, that is the key concept that I take away from the video, even though it’s not explicitly stated.

Good contingency planning doesn’t rely on fixed assumptions because plans made under today’s assumptions are likely to fail when they meet tomorrow’s reality. Rarely do our assumptions hold true over time.   Therefore we need a holistic and flexible approach which considers a variety of assumptions.  We need to consider resource allocation on a continuum and prioritize the potential threat of climate change under a variety of assumptions vs other potential and not-so-potential threats, interests and values.  We can’t afford to put all our eggs in one basket.

The military, for example, aspires to have a “full spectrum” force that can deal with humanitarian crises, high-intensity conventional warfare and everything in between.  Part of that includes planning for both likely and unlikely scenarios.  As a result the military is rarely fully-prepared for any one contingency, but is usually “prepared enough” for a wide range of contingencies.  That method of dealing with uncertainty has proven itself over time.  I personally believe (and this is probably the result of my own professional bias) that we need to prepare for climate change in a similar “full spectrum” manner, at least until there is sufficient political consensus to focus efforts in one area.

What is politically possible also needs to be considered simply because political structures (governments in this case) usually aren’t willing to suffer high opportunity costs unless the solution is a sure thing.  I think those who are predisposed to certain policy solutions need to keep that in mind – particularly those at the CAGW end of the spectrum.  From my armchair I think a lot of those advocates are shooting themselves in the foot.  Litmus tests regarding what is appropriate skepticism, for example, are not likely to generate the political support necessary to enable the policy you want – quite the opposite actually.  You’ll get high-fives from supporters and alienation from everyone else.  In order to achieve policy action on the scale you believe is required, you need to make the tent bigger, not smaller.  So it seems to me you are thinking tactically and not strategically – maybe you win some battles, but you risk losing the war.  Just something to think about.

One thing to keep in mind about senior military officers and national security people is that they are a parochial bunch who usually have bureaucratic interest in mind.  Despite all the intelligence reforms after 9/11, parochial interest still reigns and all the various agencies both cooperate and compete.  As our federal budget increasingly comes under intense pressure, you’re going to see a lot of people try to keep their organizations away from the budget ax by taking on new “threats.”  Climate change therefore represents an opportunity for parochialism that can’t be completely ignored when assessing the views of senior officials with budgetary skin in the game.  That’s a sad indictment of my own organization and profession, but I’ve seen it all too often to believe it will be any different regarding climate change.

Returning to the national security aspect of climate change for a minute, I think the focus will primarily be on consequence management because of the policy tools we have in the greater policy toolbox.  We are not equipped to deal with, for example, a carbon-reduction strategy.  The US military, in particular, has unique capabilities to quickly react to problems overseas – see the recent disaster in Haiti, for example.  Since our toolbox is limited and since we inevitably have our institutional parochialism, I doubt you will see many national security folks argue for a carbon reduction strategy if that will negatively impact their parochial interests (ie. budgets) – in other words, the military and national security bureaucracy will, in my judgment, tend to favor consequence management policies over carbon reduction.

Finally, one reason that I’ve become so interested in climate change is because it is very similar in character (but not content) to traditional national security problems.  I mentioned a few such problems in my earlier comment and I’ll focus on one here – nuclear terrorism.  Currently, this is deemed the preeminent threat to US national security (see here for a summary). This is a threat that’s difficult to quantify in terms of probabilities and there is a wide range of opinion on how to deal with it.  There are “denialists” who think it’s not much of a problem at all –so unlikely as to be irrelevant and thus requiring no policy change.  At the other end of the spectrum are those who think it’s only a matter of time before a US city gets nuked unless we take bold and decisive action now.  Does that dichotomy sound familiar?  Of course there is a middle-ground where we take reasonable, cost-effective measures to reduce the threat (increased security, better controls of nuclear material, better intelligence and detection), create and maintain capabilities to deal with the consequences should the threat materialize (response teams, medical and decontamination capabilities, etc.)  and work on a long-term solution to the problem (reduction/elimination of nuclear weapons, more limits and oversight of nuclear activities internationally, etc.).  Not coincidentally, those cost-effective measures have positive secondary effects in other areas.

Iran’s nuclear program is another example.  There are many uncertainties regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.  Even if we assume the worst, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the sure-fire remedy – toppling the government through military force – would be the wisest option.  Actions have consequences and before formulating policy we need to be reasonably sure the cure won’t be worse than the disease.

In short, I see a lot of wishful thinking on both sides of the climate change debate rooted in unrealistic and unachievable policy preferences.  I can’t definitively speak to intentions, but my sense is that many people begin with a policy preference borne out of tribal ideology instead of thoroughly examining the problem in all its complexity. In my opinion, what we need is serious policy analysis that examine costs, benefits and risks and we need to create plans that include a variety of actions flowing from a variety of assumptions instead of considering only the policy we are predisposed to.

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What do you think of the framework Andy proposes for addressing the vexing issues of uncertainty, security threats and cost-benefit considerations?

Earlier this year, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) published a withering critique of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The report generated much media attention because it was written by no less than the top intelligence officer in Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn. Among the provocative statements in his assessment:

Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade.

This alone would be obvious cause for concern. But as Michael Klare points out in this piece, counterinsurgency has become the favored strategy in the wider U.S. war against Al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism. And unlike Flynn’s highly publicized critique, the increased military emphasis on counterinsurgency, which has recently been codified in the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, is happening with “little fanfare,” as Klare writes. He also notes the Obama Administration’s invoking of failed and fragile states, such as Yemen and Somalia, as the rationale for the new military strategy.

Leaving aside the concerns raised by Flynn’s critique (which no doubt has spurred the necessary reforms–one hopes), Klare makes a compelling argument that rests on this assertion:

There is no reason to doubt that Obama and Gates believe they are acting in the nation’s–and the world’s–best interest by advocating a strategy of global counterinsurgency. Such a strategy could conceivably prevent Al Qaeda from gaining a temporary foothold in some “ungovernable area” on the fringe of the Islamic world. But it will not eliminate the conditions that give rise to Islamist extremism, nor will it ensure lasting peace.

Sure would be nice if Klare’s analysis spurred a bloggy cross exchange over at CNAS. Folks, it’s good to get out of those silos now and again.

One year ago, Pepe Escobar, a keen observer of global energy politics, wrote this:

Forget the mainstream media’s obsession with al-Qaeda, Osama “dead or alive” bin Laden, the Taliban — neo, light or classic — or that “war on terror,” whatever name it goes by. These are diversions compared to the high-stakes, hardcore geopolitical game that follows what flows along the pipelines of the planet.

Specifically, Escobar was referring to what has become known as the The New Great Game, an international power struggle over oil and gas reserves in Eurasia.

But after reading Global Warring, Cleo Paskal’s excellent new book on geopolitics in the era of climate change, I’m convinced that someone should amend the Wikipedia entry so that in addition to Eurasia, Africa and the Arctic are included as geopolitical battlegrounds for control over the world’s energy resources.

I’ll have more to say about Paskal’s book in upcoming posts. Meanwhile, here’s my review of Global Warring in Nature’s Climate Feedback.

I’m all for the U.S. improving avenues of cooperation with Mexico, especially if that helps ameliorate the miserable conditions of border communities. But in this post over at Natural Security, Will Rogers overreaches when he suggests that environmental initiatives with Mexico aids U.S. national security interests along the southern border. That can hardly be the case when the border remains a violent battleground, in large part because the U.S. government stubbornly clings to a futile, bankrupt policy: the War on Drugs.

Let me back up a minute. In his post, Rogers discusses

an ongoing bilateral, interagency effort that includes the U.S. Northern Command [NORTHCOM] the Environmental Protections Agency (EPA) and several U.S. and Mexican state and federal agencies around environmental preparedness, protection and response along the southern border.

Again, this is all good stuff, which hopefully will improve the heavily degraded environment along the U.S.-Mexican border. Here’s the additional upside that Will envisions:

Such sustained engagements have the ability to professionalize Mexico’s first responders, build cross-border good will and help assuage some of the tensions associated with one of the many laundry list of issues that continue to undermine stability in Mexico (e.g., drug trafficking) – a country whose national security is inextricably linked with ours.

But drug trafficking is not just one of the “many” issues–it is the premier one. Just consider the hook that Rogers uses for his post, this Washington Post story, which reports:

For the first time, U.S. officials plan to embed American intelligence agents in Mexican law enforcement units to help pursue drug cartel leaders and their hit men operating in the most violent city in Mexico, according to U.S. and Mexican officials.

So the U.S. is going to double down on Mexico’s whack-a-drug cartel member strategy. To see how that’s faring, let’s scroll down a bit in the WaPo story:

Since his inauguration three years ago, Calderón has pursued a U.S.-backed strategy of relying on the Mexican military to confront the cartels fighting for dominance in the billion-dollar corridors to the U.S. drug market. The Mexican troops, who lack law enforcement training or investigative abilities, have made record numbers of arrests, but few of the detained have gone to trial. Instead, the military has been accused of human rights abuses — coerced confessions, illegal detention, unlawful searches.

Hmm. Human rights abuses, coerced confessions, illegal detentions…I feel like I heard about that somewhere else, in another part of the world, until a change in Administration policy decided to go in a different direction.

But I digress. Let’s get back to how that tip of the spear approach is working out in Mexico:

According to U.S. and Mexican officials, the municipal police cannot be trusted, nor can they operate on their own. One U.S. official said a local police chief was caught briefing his cartel bosses via cellphone immediately after planning sessions.

“This is an enormous mess. It is now starting to hurt Calderón politically. He cannot point to any success. And he is running out of time,” said Jorge Castañeda, a former Mexican foreign minister and now a professor at New York University.

Oh, but here in the U.S. we don’t have that problem. Time just stands still, while a broken, failed policy marches on. So if Calderón pays a political price, then it will be up to his successor to convince the U.S. that it should rethink it’s own war on drugs. Because guess what: we don’t have that debate in this country.

And yes, at some point, if Mexico unravels because of its own internal rot and corruption, that’s a national security problem for the U.S. No well intentioned environmental initiatives between the U.S and Mexico will stop that fire from burning out of control. That’s because the fuel that feeds the illicit, immensely profitable drug trade is demand from American consumers. U.S. policy makers that keep funding the war on drugs are just fanning the flames.

This exchange between Republican Senator James Inhofe and Deborah Solomon in the Sunday NYT magazine is priceless.

Inhofe: Can you tell me one reason to close Gitmo?

NYT: Because it’s on foreign soil, where prisoners don’t have the same legal rights as prisoners tried here, and we want to apply the same laws to everybody.

Inhofe: You want to apply the same laws to terrorists that are captured as you do to criminals in America?

NYT: Yes.

Inhofe: Wow.

NYT: Because we have to take the high road as Americans.

Inhofe: I see. That’s an interesting concept.

Looks like retired military brass are fanning out to make the case for a national security angle to climate change. That’s going to add a whole new interesting dimension to the political debate.

It also presents a sustained narrative that Marc Morano will have trouble countering at Climate Depot. Many of his headlines and links are intended to mock  people he often labels as “climate alarmists.” You can’t do that to four stars. It won’t play well.

So based on today’s Climate Depot headline (”Sad to Watch: Vice Adm. McGinn spouts silliness”), it appears that Morano will try blunting the military angle with patronization. Kinda like when you pat an aging, doddering relative on the head, while ruing his declining memory or intellectual capacity.

Sorry, Marc, you’re going to have to do better than that.

Did anyone else shake their head in confusion while reading yesterday’s uneven NYT editorial on climate change politics and policy? It starts off remarking that that Congress has no “plausible strategy for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions” and then duly notes

that the Waxman-Markey bill

is not as strong as needed, but is a start.

A few graphs later, after discussing tipping points, it quotes Rajendra Pachauri, the head of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, saying that, “what we do in the next two or three years will determine our future.” To underscore both the air of urgency and lack of coordinated action, the Times then immediately notes that Pachauri

said that two years ago.

Discouraged by this state of affairs,  the Times, like many climate advocates, is latching on to a “new strategy”:

warning that global warming poses a serious threat to national security.

As the editorial observes, it’s “pretty good politics” when you have four-star generals and the “national security establishment” making this “line of argument.”  True. But that won’t change what is also widely considered to be the weak, ineffectual policy prescription in Congress.

[UPDATE: Morano insists I got this wrong. See below.]

Not a peep from Climate Depot about this hearing and the climate climate change concerns expressed by former Senator John Warner and military brass. When it comes to mocking so-called climate alarmism, Morano rarely misses an opportunity. Yet this is twice in the past week.

I guess the national security angle doesn’t fit the master narrative he’s trying to convey at Climate Depot. Or he doesn’t want to take pot shots at the miltiary. Probably both.

LATER: In an email to me this morning, Morano writes that, “I posted at least two articles on the vaunted ‘military’ angle you think I am so afraid of. Search my page right now…you owe me a correction!!!”

I know my eyes are in need of new specs but all I see is a link to this blog post with this Morano headline:

“Just When You Thought Global Warming Couldn’t Get More Stupid, In Walks John Kerry.”

And a link to this news story with this Morano headline:

“Laughable: Senate warned US will be ‘dragged into conflict if global climate change goes unchecked.’”

Ok, I did initially see the first Morano headline and I based my argument on the fact that he was mocking Kerry and not Warner or the retired military officials. That was convenient of Morano.  As for his second “Laughable” link (which I only just saw), Morano clearly is poking fun at the testimony–that much I’ll grant– but he still refuses to zing the military brass or Warner in the personal manner that he reserves for Kerry, democrats and climate scientists that assert climate change is for real.

As soon as I see him demonstrate that–and he’ll have more opportunities–I’ll be sure to note it.

EVEN LATER: Scanning Climate Depot late Friday, I noticed that Morano links here with this top headline:

Laughable: Fmr. Sen. Warner: “There’s a building base of evidence that global warming is contributing to much of the instability of the world today.”

Summarizing the theme of a recent hearing at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kate Sheppard at Grist writes:

More senators and citizens might support a climate bill if it emphasized the national security challenges presented by climate change, former Virginia Sen. John Warner (R) argued on Tuesday.

I’ve made similar points here and here.

I’ll say it again: I’m astonished that enviros and climate advocates haven’t made this central to their argument. The other side surely understands the powerful symbolism of military brass and national security hawks warning of climate change. Why do you think Marc Morano at Climate Depot offers no linkage to news of the hearings or statements from Warner and the other witnesses?

Imagine the histrionics when Lou Dobbs figures out the climate change angle to one of his pet causes. In the meantime, with respect to yesterday’s big report, this is a reasonable take on domestic security issues, particularly those related to the border:

As much as the United States will have its hands full dealing with the impacts of climate change, many Latin American countries will face more severe impacts and will face them sooner, motivating increased migration across our borders. If the politics of immigration are difficult today, imagine a decade hence when millions of South Americans suddenly run out of the glacier water they depend on.